PRISONERS OF WAR AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY by Richardson, Walton K.
325 
PRISONERS OF WAR 
AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
Walton K. Richardson 
. Historical Development of the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of 
war historically hav(! heml used as 
instruments of foreign poli~y. From 
ancient times to the Vietnam war there 
has been a growing concern for the 
humane treatment of prisoners of war. 
This trend is evident from an examina-
tion of the attempts to codify tIll! 
standards of treatment accorded to pris-
oners into rceogni:r.ed rules of inter-
national law. This changc of standards 
falls logically into four stages. The 
divil;ion between these stages is not 
sharp and precise. Rather, overlapping 
appnars as the neW method of treatment 
repluc(!s the old in gradual transition. 
N(werthdess, a ddinit(! progression is 
nolit'(!ahh! in whieh eat:h mod(! of hun· 
tiling prisOIlI'rs LI('(:allH!, in turn, tIll! 
generally ~I(:cept(:d praetil!(:, 
It is during the last slag(:, tIll! 20lh 
century, that the most definitive rules 
for humane treatment of prisoners of 
war have been developed into inter-
national law in the aftermath of World 
War II. It seems a paradox, though, that 
concurrently the actual treatment of 
these victims of war has degenerated to 
the treatments common during the 
earlier slages. 
In ancient times, from llll! first 
armed conflicts recordctl in tIll: history 
of mankind, the almost universal fate of 
the captive was death. 1 He was either 
slaughtered on the hattlcfidd, tortured 
and put to death after the hallIe, or 
used as a sacrificial offering. The eir-
cllmstanees varied, but his fate. was 
utmost inevitlluh:. TI!slimony of this 
pmdie(! is giVl'n in IIIwimlt hislorielll 
writings, illduding llw Old 'I'eslanll!lIt, 
as well as in scenes depicted on has-
rdids.2 
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The transition to the second stage 
also took place in ancient times. It 
probably was largely motivated by eco-
nomic considerations. Ancient' con-
querors came to the realization that 
profit was to be gained by sparing the 
lives of captives and making them their 
slaves. Gradually it became the acceptcd 
custom to make slaves of those captured 
in battle. Entire' nations were subjected 
to slavery. In fact, captivity resulting 
from battle was the origin of the prac-
tice of slavery. 3 The Romans generally 
enslaved their prisoners, although they 
also killed some outright and developed 
others as gladiators. 
Humanitarian concern for captives 
appeared for the first time in the third 
stage. Yet, the basic economic factor 
remained very much in evidence. Pris-
oners not held in slavery were returned 
to their homes after payment of ran-
som. The practice of ransom had been 
used previously on occasion, notably in 
ancient tribal warfare and by the Greeks 
ani! Romans. However, during these 
times the practice was more an isolated 
act of mercy rather than the prevailing 
custom. It was not until the Middle 
Ages that ransom supplanted slavery as 
the normal practice in the fate of 
prisoners of war, especially those of 
aristocratic origin.4 A significant codifi-
cation of the practice of ransom re-
sulted when the Lateran Council of 
1179 prohibited enslaving captives who 
were Christian.s 
The final stage was attained with the 
emergence of the nation-state system 
and modern international law. Humani-
tarian considerations became increas-
ingly influential as the treatment of 
prisoners of war was addressed and 
defined in international agreements. 
Most historians trace the start of this 
stage to the Treaty of Westphalia of 
1648, which ended the Thirty Years 
War. This was the first international 
instrument to establish modern rules for 
the treatment of prisoners of war. It 
provided that prisoners of both sides 
were to be freed without payment of 
ransom and without exception or rescr-
vations.6 
Shortly before this Hugo Grotius, the 
eminent Dutch jurist commonly re-
ferred to as the Father of International 
Law, published in 1625 his great work, 
De J uro Belli ac Pacis. Grotius exerted 
profound influence on the development 
of international law with his appeal to 
the law of nature as a moderating 
influence in the conduct of war. Al-
though he continucd to rccognh .. e the 
right to cnslave captives, he advocated 
exchange and ransom instead.7 
The fourth stage was characterized 
by bilateral treaties and unilatcral dec-
larations. Between 1581 and 1864 there 
were at least 291 international docu-
ments dealing with the treatment of the 
sick, wounded, and captured. One of 
the more important was the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce between the 
United States and Prussia in 1785. The 
First Geneva Convention (1864) was 
patterned closely after it.8 
The first tentative step in the transi-
tion to the great multilateral treaties of 
the 20th century was the diplomatic 
conference called by Switzerland at 
Geneva in 1864. The 12 participating 
nations produced thc Geneva Conven-
tion of 22 August IBM for the Amdio-
ration of the Conditions of Soldiers 
Wounded in Armed Forces in th~ 
Ficld.9 Its 10 articles were the first 
attempt to create international law by 
virtue of the ratification or accession of 
all the great powers. This First Geneva 
Convention was .ratified by all the 
powers by 1867. It was ratified by the 
United States in 1882 and subsequently 
by a total of 54 nations. 1 0 
From this time until around the turn 
of the century and the start of the 
Hague Conventions of 1899, several 
attempts were made to codify the rules 
of warfare, including treatmcnt of pris-
oners. The most notable of thcse oe-
eUITI!d in Septemb(!r ] 880, wlll!lI the 
Institute of International Law adopted a 
"Manual of the Laws and Customs of 
War" at Oxford, England. Although 
never adopted, the "Oxford Manual," as 
it became known, influenced the treat-
ment of prisoners of the Boer War. 11 
The First Hague Conference, called 
in May 1899, produced three conven-
tions. Convention No. II dealt with the 
laws and customs of land warfare and 
contained a section of 17 articles con-
ccrning the treatment of prisoners of 
war.12 These articles were based largely 
on the Oxford MiIliual and were ratified 
as part of Convention No. II by 24 
nations, including the United States. 
The Geneva Convention of 1906 for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Sick and Wounded in Armies in the 
Field, drafted by representatives of 35 
nations, contained 33 articles which 
were more comprehensive and explicit 
than those of the First (1864) Geneva 
Convention. 
The Second Hague Conference, hcld 
in 1907, produced 14 conventions 
covering the conduct of war, which 
included an updating and improving of 
the articles pcrtaining to prisoners of 
war contained in the Hague Convention 
No. II of 1899. 
A distinction should be made he-
twem} the laws and rules or" the Geneva 
Conventions of ] 1164 and 1906 (as wdl 
as the subsequent 1929 and 1949 con-
ventions) and laws and rules resulting 
from the· conventions of the Hague 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Both 
conventions arc based on, and moti-
vated by, humanitarian 'considerations. 
There is some redundancy between the 
two, particularly with regard to pris-
oners of war. Basically, the Hague Con-
ventions codify the rules of war and 
attempt to restrict the usc of weapons 
and the application of force in war. The 
Gmu!va Conventions, on the other hand, 
arc SIII!cifically cont:t!nwd with tltt: pro-
tt!ction of the individual against the 
abust: of force in wartime. J 3 
The Two World Wars. The experiencc 
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of W orId War I demonstrated the need 
for increased protection for prisoners of 
war and the necessity of improving the 
provisions of the Geneva. and Hague 
Conventions. Starting in 1921 the Intcr-
national Law Association and the Inter-
national Rcd Cross (IRC) recommended 
review and amplification of the Hague 
Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva 
Convention of 1906. These efforts led 
the Swiss Government to issue invita-
tions to 47 nations to aLtend a confer-
cnce in G(!neva, starting in July 1929, to 
revise the conventions on prisoners of 
war. On 27 July the delegates adopted 
two conventions; the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1929 for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and the 
Sick of Armies in the Field and the 
Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In 
approving these conventions the dele-
gates were for the first time attempting 
to create international law directed 
toward the humanitarian treatment of 
prisoners of war rather than merely 
recording existing practices as had heen 
done· at the two Hague Conferences 
(1899 and 1907).14 
By the time of American entry into 
World War II in December 1941, 35 
nations had ratified or announced their 
adlwrt:nc(: to tht: Geneva Convt:ntionl! of 
1.929. Six additional nations announced 
their adherence during the war. The 
U.S.S.R. aeccded in 1932 to the conven-
tion concerning humane treatment of 
the siCK and wounded. However, she 
refused to accept as hinding the conven-
tion relative to prisoner-of-war treat-
ment on the contention that the Hague 
Convention No. IV of 1907 was ade-
quate. Japan never did announce ad-
herence to the Geneva Convention of 
1929.15 
Tlu: crud and inhumane treatment of 
Allit:ti prisont:rs of war lit tht: hands of 
tIlt! Japanese has bt:en well chronided. 
The saga of the Balaan Death March 
remains infamous. Tht: apparent basis 
for this treatment can be traced, in part, 
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to a differing Oriental philosophy and a 
general antipathy for Caucasians. The 
Japanese interrogated prisoners of war 
primarily to obtain military informa-
tion; they wcre required to perform 
tiring menial work under adverse condi-
tions and wcre severely punished for 
violation of rulcs. The difference in 
diets between the Japanese captors and 
the Western prisoners of war also con-
tributcd to the plight of the eaptives.16 
The Nazi regime of Hitler earned iLs 
mark in history for inhumanity. The 
gmlocidc of HII estimated 6 million Jews 
and the ruthless reigns of terror imposed 
in occupied areas of Europe during 
World War II led to the Nuremburg 
Trials. Despite this barbarous record, 
the treatment of American and British 
prisoners of war by their German cap-
tors, though not exemplary, did reflect 
conscious attempts to adhere to the 
Geneva Convention of 1929.17 
The record of treatment of prisoners 
of war in the hands of the U.S.S.R. 
during and after World War II is atro-
cious. In 1939, when the Nazi-Soviet 
pact was still in effect, it was known 
that the bulk of the Polish Officcr Corps 
had surrendered and were in Russian 
hands. In April 1943 the Germans an-
nounced to the world the discovery of 
mass graves in till: Katyn forest !!Ontain-
ing the remains of some 8,000 Polish 
officers. The Soviets denied the allega-
tion, labeling the German announce-
ment a propaganda ploy. However, the 
Soviets, not the Germans, refused to 
permit an investigation by the IRC. 
Subsequently, it was confirmed that this 
mass murder was perpetrated by the 
Russians in 1940.18 
Further indications of Soviet callous-
ness toward human life in general and 
prisoners of war in particular arc given 
in the Churchill memoirs. During the 
"Big Three" summit meeting at Tehran 
in December 1943, Stalin announeed 
that it would probably be necessary to 
liquidate some 50,000 officers of the 
"German Commanding Staff" as a 
means- of insuring a permanent solution 
to thc problem of postwar G(~rman 
rcsurgence. Churchill was so appalled by 
the proposal that he abruptly left the 
meeting. 
The tolal number of German pris-
oners of war and civilians displaccd to 
Russia to "help rebuild Russia" will 
probably never be known. 1 9 Indications 
of the cynical and ruthless disregard of 
all humaniLarian principlcs hy the 
U.S.S.R. wcre (widmleed at Llw Mm;('()w 
Con fermlee of Forl!ign l\1inil:lh~rs, when 
Molotov .lIInoune(:d on I'" M.m:h 19"'7 
that 1,003,974 German prisoners of war 
had been released and that 890,532 
were still being held. Not only was this 
"new" figure of 1,894,506 significantly 
lowcr than the previously announced 
total of 3,180,000 in May 1945, it was 
bland admission that 890,532 were still 
held captive in violation of the terms of 
surrender imposed on the Germans at 
Rheims on 7 May 1947 and the Pots-
dam Deelaration of 26 July 1945.20 
Despite repeated attempts on the 
purt of the IRC and the Govcrnments of 
the United States, Frane(~, mul (;rmlt 
Britain, the Soviets refused inspections, 
negotiations, or in some instanccs even 
to reply to official qucries on the 
subject of repatriation of Gcrman or 
.Jupan($(~ prisoners of war.21 Finally, in 
the fall of 1950, this mattcr of U.S.S.R. 
failure to rcpatriatc or otherwise ac-
count for prisoners of war was pre-
sented to the United Nations. Germany 
reported that as of March 1950 some 
923,000 German prisoners of war, veri-
fied in the hands of the U.S.S.R., were 
still missing. Japan listed at least 
376,939 prisoners of war unaccounted 
for at the end of 1949. 
On 14 December 1950 the United 
Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 
43 to 5, adoptcd a resolution exprcssing 
concern over tIll: larg{~ numher of pris-
0I11:rs of war that had "nuitlwr bmm 
repatriated nor otherwise accounted 
for." Thc rcsolution providcd for an Ad 
Hoc Commission to settle the issue.22 
Tlw U.S.S.R. adamantly refusI!d to eo-
opl!rate with the commission investiga-
tion?3 
The harsh treatment of German and 
Japanese prisoners of war by the Soviets 
could be expected, though not eon-
dOI1(!d, based on the treatment of Soviet 
prisoners of war by these nations. The 
Japanese, as mentioned earlier, treated 
a" prisoners in a subhuman manner. The 
German treatment of Russian prisoners 
was more harsh than their treatment of 
U.S. and British prisoners.24 The 
Soviets and Germans did not provide 
lists of prisoners of war to each other as 
sp(!cified by the Geneva Convention of 
1929; whereas the United States and the 
British did exchange lists with the Ger-
mans. 
In October 19tH, the Red army 
issued a directive to a" Communist 
int(!rrogators whieh induded the fol-
lowing instructions: "From the very 
moment of capturc by the Red Army, 
and during the entire period of captiv-
ity, the enemy cnlisted men and officers 
must be under eontinuous indoctrina-
tion by our politil!al workers and intf!r-
rogators."25 This din:ctive was followed 
by a series of othcr directives explaining 
in detail the type of information to he 
I!xtraeted from the German prisoners, 
how to conduct til!! interrogations, and 
the manner and ext(!nt of indoctrina-
tion. In general, these instructions pro-
vided for an initial interrogation of 
about 30 minutes on purely military 
matters as soon as conditions permitted. 
Subsequent interrogations were to be 
made at regimental level, again on mili-
tary matters. Officers and senior NCO's 
were also programed for further interro-
gation on military matters at division 
level. 
Upon arrival at a permanent camp, 
prisoners were earlllarkl!d for more in-
t(!l\l,iv(! interrogation. Tlw pI!rlllalwnt 
eamps w(m: l'onlrolh'c\ hy tl\(' "I\IVI>." 
muh'r till! snpl:rvision of tlu: I\linistry of 
Internal Affairs, not til!! Ministry of 
Dcfense. IL was during this period that a 
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fundamental evaluation was made eon-
el:rning the futlln! of eaeh prisoner of 
war. The prisOllf!r was plaeed in either 
of two categories. Either he was a 
subject for indoctrination or he was not, 
in which case he was consigned to a 
labor camp. 
Understanding of the Soviet treat-
nwnt of prisoners of war can be gained 
from the writings of survivors such as 
Sgl. Maj. Helmut M. Fehling, who en-
dured 50111(: 6 years of eaptivity from 
Oc:toher 194:l to Novl:mher 1949, and 
Lt. Col. \V olfgang Sehe", imprisoned 
from January 1945 to October 1955, 
almost II years. Their vivid firsthand 
accounts evidence the attention given to 
the NCO's and officers in the interroga-
tion process leading to the fundamental 
categorization of the prisoners. Until 
this decision was made, physical pres-
sun! was applied only to selected in-
dividuals, never on a group basis. How-
ever, once it was determined through 
interrogation that a prisoner was not a 
profitable candidate for indoctrination, 
he was sent to a labor camp to assist in 
rebuilding Russia. The tn!lItnu!nt of 
these "Iahor" prisoners, as distinct from 
those who wcre carmarked for indoc-
trination, was unbelievably inhuman. It 
WllS this group of lahor-eamp prisoners 
who faeed a constant Laltlc: for survival 
and whose ranks were thinned by the 
hundreds of thousands not able to 
survive the ballie. For example, of the 
93,000 prisoners captured at the hattIe 
of Stalingrad in February 1943, only 
6,000 survived to return to Germany 
through 1958.26 
Within months of the German inva-
sion of Poland and Russia in June 1941, 
the Red Army recognized the need to 
employ psychological warfare in sup-
port of military operations. By early 
1942 the Seventh Division of the Red 
ArlllY (prop.i~arHIa) was operatin~ on 
till! I'al'tern front. (;I:rlllan 1:lIIi~n;~ ar\(1 
pri&lIIers of war wl!re u&:I1. Vi(!tories of 
the Gcrman Armies and crudcnl!ss of 
the propaganda efforts initially 
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hampered Soviet efforts. In early 1942, 
in an attempt to improve the system, 
the Soviets established anti-Fascist 
schools (A-schools) staffed with selected 
cadres to indoctrinatc prisoners of war 
and train them for usc with the 7th 
Division. The A-school candidates wcre 
carefully choscn through a vigorous and 
repetitive interrogation scrcening pro-
cess. The first "hard-core" grours were 
limited to 50 to 100 prisoners. 7 This 
initial effort of using prisoners of war as 
propaganda instruments to undermine 
the morale of thc frontline troops was 
greatly expanded as more collaborators 
became available from the mounting 
numbcr of prisoncrs being taken and as 
the prisoners discerned the difference in 
treatment at labor 'and political camps. 
The A-schools, where students were 
offered lectures in Marxist-Leninist doc-
trines, group discussions, self-criticism, 
autobiographical eritiques, and rigid dis-
cipline, were continued until the early 
] 950 'so Most hard-core graduates were 
later transferred to East Germany to 
occupy key 'positions in the administra-
tion, party bureaucraey, and media of 
mass communications. 
Post-World War II and the Korean 
War. Even before the fuIl story of tl.le 
shocking treatment visited upon mil-
lions of prisoners of World War II had 
completely unfolded, it was apparent 
that the Geneva Conventions of 1929 
and conventions of the Hague Con-
fe,rences of 1899 and 1907 required 
revision. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) prepared four 
draft conventions. These were reviewed 
by the Preliminary Conference of Na-
tional Red Cross Societies at Geneva in 
July 1946 and the Conference of Gov-
ernment Experts at Geneva in April 
1947. They were then considered by the 
17th International Conference of the 
Red Cross at Stockholm in August 
1948.28 
Finally, the draft conventions were 
submitted to a diplomatic conference of 
59 nations at Geru:va in April 1949. TIH: 
conventions did not corm: into forc(: 
until 21 October I9!iO, and nOlu: of till: 
parties in the Kon:an war had ratifi(:d 
till: conventions at the time of the 
outbreak of hostilities of 25 June 1950. 
In prompt response to a qucry from the 
ICRC, thc United States on 3 July 1950 
announccd full adherence to till: provi-
sions of the Geneva ConVl:lltions of 
1949. Two days latcr, on :; July, the: 
South Korean Governme:nt formally 
announced its adhercnce to the conven-
tions. As with U.S. acceptancc:, South 
Korea agreed to admit reprcsentatives of 
the lCRC into the area and to cooperate 
fuIly with those repre:sentatives. The 
Chincse Communists did not state a 
position until 13 July 1952, when Chou 
En-lai announced their recognition of 
the conventions "since they are basical-
ly conducive to a lasting peace. ,>2 9 
Repeated messages from the ICRC to 
the North Korcan Government were 
ignored. On 13 July 1950, Pak Heu 
Yem, North Korean Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, signed a message to the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations 
stating that: "the Demoeratic P(:oph: 's 
Rcpublic of Korca is strictly abiding by 
the principles of the Geneva Convention 
in respcet to prisoners of war. ,,30 With 
this message and suhse:que:nt commit-
ments on the part of United Nations 
members providing forces in support of 
South Korea, all participants in this first 
war after promlligntion of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 had indicated ad-
herence. 
. By mid-July 1950, representatives of 
the lCRC were admitted to South Korea 
to commence on-site inspcction and to 
report concerning United Nations Corn-
mand (UNC) treatment of North 
Korean prisoners of war. 
As of 2 August 1950, the North 
Korean Governmcnt had not responded 
to ,IllY lCRC query or message: on till: 
subjcct. Repeated attempts, even 
through the Chinese Government in 
Peking, to gain permission for an ICRC 
delegate to enter North Korea had met 
with silence and inaction. Finally, on 15 
August, a ray of hope was seen when 
permission was granted for an ICRC 
delegate to enter China to negotiate 
with the North Korean Embassy repre-
sentatives on entry into North Korea.31 
This hope proved to be unfounded, and 
, further appeal to Jacob Malik, U.S.S.R. 
representative on the U.N. Security 
Council, was ignored. 
Even after presentation of lists of 
5,230 North Korean soldiers held cap-
tive by the UNC in mid-September 
1950, the ICRC could not elicit any 
communication or reaction from Pyong-
yang. The North Koreans did not at-
tempt to provide packages for these 
captives nor did they try to get mail to 
or from them. The message was as clear 
as it had been from the Russians of 
World War II. The Communists, whose 
governments arc founded on concern 
for the workers and peasants, were not 
concerncd with the welfare of their 
prisoners of war while they were in the 
hands of the UNC. 
The extent of the brutal, cruel, and 
inhuman treatmen't imposed on UNC 
captives by the North Koreans was not 
fully known at the time. Yet, shortly 
after the Inchon landings, gruesome 
examples wcre uncovered by the ad-
vancing U.N. forces. At Kumchon, 
Taejon, and other places, as the UNC 
forces advanced up the peninsula, the 
evidence of brutal mass executions of 
UNC prisoners of war and civilians was 
uncovered. 32 The full extent of the 
barbaric treatmcnt of UNC prisoners of 
war at the hands of the North Korcans 
did not bccome known until after the 
prisoncrs had been repatriated in August 
and September 1953. 
In piecing together the threads of the 
story of U.S. Marines captured during 
the Korean war, a 1\'1arine author docu-
nwnted that of one group 'of 38 U.S. 
officers of all services captured by the 
North Koreans through September 
1950, only nine survived to the spring 
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of 1951.33 Though the numbers in-
volved were small compared to .other 
conflicts, especially W orld War II, the 
overall record of treatment of UNC 
prisoners of war in the hands of the 
North Koreans matches' anI in sheer 
cruelty' and inhumanity.3 Of the 
known 7,190 U.S. prisoners of war 
captured during the Korean war, 2,730, 
or 38 percent, died in captivity. This is a 
higher percentage than experienced in 
our own Civil War in the middle of the 
last century or of U.S. captives of the 
Japanese during World War II. The 
majority of these 2,730 who died were 
captured during the first 6 months of 
the war when the North Koreans had 
custody of the prisoners of war.3S In 
addition to the 2,730 who died in 
captivity, 1,036 others have been 
authenticated as victims of battlefield 
atrocities, mostly in massacres such as at 
Kumchon and Taejon.36 
The intervention of the Chinese ilJ 
the conflict in November 1950, in addi-
tion to changing the conduct of the war, 
also dramatically changed the enemy's 
treatment and approach in handling and 
processing UNC prisoners of war held 
captive by the Communists. The Chi-
nese took over control of the prisoner-
of-wur camps starting in December 
1950.37 No longer was the main thcme 
of treatment senseless beatings, public 
parading of prisoners before enemy 
citizenry who stared, spit upon, and 
beat them, and limited (though fre-
quently brutal) interrogation for mili-
tary information. Concurrent with the 
Chinese intervention came a marked 
change in the treatment of the pris-
OIlcrs. 
The Chinese publicly referred to 
thcir policy as the "Lenient Policy." 
Initially, the UNC prisoners could not 
believe they were not to be shot or 
otherwise maltreated upon capture. 
Rather, the Chinese advised most pris-
oners that they only wanted to help 
them now that they had been "liberated 
from the control of the imperialists. ,,38 
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By January 1951 the Chinese had es-
tablished their first model indoetrina-
tion center at a permanent prisoner-of-
war camp ncar the Yalu River town of 
Pyoktong. Designated "Camp 5" by the 
Chinese, it became known facetiously 
among the UNC prisoners as "Peaceful 
Valley.,,39 Originally about 300 Ameri-
can prisoners of war were selected for 
this pilot indoctrination center and in-
stitution of the "Lenient Policy." Here 
the pattern of treatment quickly be-
came abundantly clear. Calculated le-
niency was shown in return for "co-
operation"; harassment, mental and 
physical pressure for neutrality; and 
brutality for resistance to their "lenien-
cy.'>4 0 
To the Chinese, cooperation meant 
attending classes on the Marxist-Leninist 
theories; informing on feHow prisoners 
who resisted; signing documents and 
petitions seeking peace or acknowl-
edging the "rightness" of the Com-
munist cause; broadcasts of the same 
type propaganda or even stronger de-
nouncements of the "American Wall 
Street warmongers"; and making self-
accusations before fellow prisoners. 
These "progressivcs," as the cooperators 
became known, found themselves under 
mounting pressure to succumb to the 
increasing demands of the Chines(! in-
doctrination program. This trend, so 
easy to discern in a position of comfort-
able reflection, was not apparent to 
many subjected to the treatment under 
the conditions existing in "Peaceful 
Valley." Paradoxically, many prisoners 
became problTessives to be relieved of 
the physical and psychological pressures 
imposed by the Chinese captors. The 
same held true for the "neutrals," or 
those who gave indications that their 
will might be broken, but had not yet 
overtly cooperated.41 
The miRn()mer of Ihe "I.eni('nl 
Policy" IH:(:anw Rlrikin~ly apl'an~nt 10 
the "reaetionarieR," or resisters to Chi-
nese indoctrination. The cases of Capt. 
Jesse V. Booker, USMC, and Maj. John 
J. I)lInn, U.S. Army, are typical of the 
treatnwnt viRitecl on "n:actionary" pris-
oners. Booker was the first marine to be 
taken prisoner in the Korean war. Fly-
ing from the decks of the U.S.S. Valley 
Forge, his plane was shot down on 7 
August 1950. Dunn had been serving as 
an adviser to Republic of Korea (ROK) 
forces whose positions had been overrun 
by the Chinese ncar Kunu-ri in Novem-
ber 1950.42 These officers were sub-
jected to frequent and inccssant interro-
gation centcred on their political bcliefs 
and family backgrounds. They wert! 
kept awake by beatings and blowing 
smoke into their forcibly opened eyes. 
Still refusing to cooperate, they were 
tied to stakes in the open or placed in 
cramped solitary holes in the ground 
and left naked for hours on end in the 
subfreezing weather of the winter of 
1950-51'in the Yalu River valley. Still 
not willing to do the bidding of their 
captors, both Booker and Dunn were 
separately and repeatedly exposed to 
the threat of execution, in which the 
"game of Russian roulette" was played 
by the Chinesc interrogators.4 3 
While the Chinese took control of 
the UNC prisoners of war in Communit-lt 
hands, they did permit their North 
Korean comrades to partic:ipa te' and 
pn:~lIll1ably Ic:arn tlu: priru:iplc:s of iIlL(:r-
rogation and indoctrination for political 
objectives. "Pak's Palace" on the out-
skirts of Pyongyang, the North Korean 
capital, was named for Major Pak, the 
North Korean chief interrogator. This 
infamous center was singled out in the 
Sccretary of Defense Advisory Commit-
tee on Prisoller of War Report of ] 955 
as heing "the worst camp endlln~d by 
American prisolu:rs of war.'>44 Captain 
Fink, a U.S. Marine officer, was ques-
tioned in 1951 by a Russian female 
interro~ator over a period of silvera I 
(Iay~. Th(~ inl!'rrogaliollR w('n~ I'UIH:-
IlIal(:(1 wilh r(~l'eal!'(1 II(!alill~ll of Cap. 
tain Fink for non[(!Sl'onsivl! llllt-lW(:rs.45 
Even before the Chinese intervention 
in the Korean war, Communist usc of 
prisoners of war for political purposes 
was evident. In late August 1950, Jacob 
A. Malik, U.S.S.R. delegate to the U.N. 
Security Council, issued a statement to 
the world press claiming to have re-
edved a cable of protest to the war 
signed by 39 captured U.S. officers. The 
prob:st was "against further senseless 
bloodshed in Korea." The names of the 
39 officers were released and included 
"Capt. Jesse V. Booker.'>4 6 In light of 
the treatment subsequently inflicted on 
Booker, it is doubtful if the Com-
munists ever obtained Booker's signa-
ture on the protest. Indeed, the major-
ity of the officers whose names were 
rcleased subsequently denied under oath 
having signed the protest.47 
This early and rather clumsy propa-
ganda attempt was greatly refined and 
improved after the Chinese took over 
control of the prisoners of war in 
December 1950. In January 1951 the 
Chinese circulated the "Stockholm 
Peace Appeal" in "Peaceful ValIey" and 
other camps with indoctrination cen-
ters. This appeal had been issued just 
prior to the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea as a result of a Stockholm 
meeting of the "Communist World 
Peace Committee" in May 1950.48 In 
circulating this appeal, peace commit-
tees were formed in the prisoner-of-war 
camps to develop and sign a petition to 
the U.N. appealing for peace. This peti-
tion was sent to tIll! U.N. in February 
1951 with the signatures of many 
American prisoners of war .. 49 
Concurrent with the success of the 
U.N. spring offensive of 1951, the 
North Koreans on 8 May 1951 lodged a 
formal protest to the U.N. charging the 
U.S. forces with germ warfare.5 0 
It was at this time that the Com-
munists tried to substantiate these 
charges by a program aimed at gaining 
the eoop,!ration of lar~c1y U.S. Air 
Force flying personnel.5 On 16 May 
1952 the signed confessions of two 
captured U.S. lieutenants appeared in 
People's China, a Peking newspaper, and 
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were announced to the world.5 2 De-
spite the failure to have their alIegations 
proven with the aid of confessions of 
American prisoners of war, grave doubt 
on the matter was created in world 
public opinion. 
In the aftermath of the Korean war, 
Communist attempts to usc prisoners of 
war and their families to weaken the 
opposition came more clearly into 
focus. In testimony before a U.S. House 
of Representatives Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities 
in .I une 1956, FBI witnesses and former 
U.S. prisoners of thc Korean war ex-
posed the extent of the Communist 
efforts in this area. ''The Save Our Sons 
Committee" (SOSC) based in Argo, III. 
became active in 1952 and remained so 
until October 1953, the month follow-
ing the repa'triation of the Korean war 
prisoners. The SOSC consisted of two 
native-born American women, identified 
by FBI agents as members of the Ameri-
can Communist Party. These women 
obtained the names, camp locations, 
and other particulars of American pris-
oners from Communist sources. They 
wrote lellers to the parents and friends 
of thcse prisoners, encouraging them to 
sign petitions and letters to Congress-
men and newspapers. They were able to 
correspond directly ~ith the Ameriean 
prisoners in a matter of days, whereas 
mail between prisoners and next of kin 
was normalIy not alIowed hy the Com-
munist captors. Though these two 
women repeatedly claimed the "fifth 
amendment" during the hearings, facts 
presented by other witnesses clearly 
established Communist efforts in this 
area.53 
The major issue of the Korean Armis-
tice Negotiations was voluntary repatria-
tion. A convincing position is that the 
UNC demands, insisting on voluntary 
n:p:ltriatioll, were in violation of the 
Geneva Conventio/ls of 1949, speci-
ficalIy articles 7 and 118. Article 7 
provides that prisoners may under no 
circumstances renounce, in whole or in 
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part, rights securcd to them hy thc 
convention. Article 118 statcs that pris-
oners of war shall he released and 
repatriated without delay after thc ces-
sation of hostilities. The opposing 
humanitarian view of not forcing some 
87,000 people to he committed to 
return to control of regimes they ahhor 
also has merit. It would he difficult to 
ignore the lessons learned from the 
Soviet treatment of repatriated person-
nel at the end of World War II. 
Vice Adm. C. Turncr Joy, the initial 
Chief UNC Negotiator from July 1951 
until 22 May 1952, differed strongly on 
this point, although his position as UNC 
negotiator required him to support it. 
He felt the voluntary repatriation issue 
cost our prisoners an extra year of 
captivity and cost the UNC an addi-
tional 50,000 casualties., Joy later con-
tended that the welfare of ex-enemy 
soldiers was placed abovc that of our 
own personnel in Communist prison 
camps and those still fighting In the 
hattleline.54 
To date, international law has not 
codified the principle of voluntary re-
patriation. Yet the signed armisticc it-
self may sustain the principle as a 
precedent. In any event, this principle is 
Korea's legaey to Vietnam. Considera-
tion must he given this principle to 
insure success in ohtaining the release of 
our prisoners of war in the months 
ahead. 
Vietnam. Major conflicts have given 
impetus to changes in international laws 
which have heen increasingly concerned 
with the humanitarian treatment of 
prisoners and other victims of war. The 
Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949, 
following World Wars I and II, respec-
tively, illustrate this. No change oc-
curred following the Korean war. Reso-
lution of the voluntary repatriation 
issue stemming from the Korean armis-
tice was heralded as a significant prece-
dent hy President Eisenhower. Yet, the 
impact or'this precedent on interna-
tional law is a matter of conjecture at 
this time. With this possihle exception, 
international law relative to the treat-
ment of prisoners of war is essentially 
the same for Vietnam as it was for the 
Korean war. 
Shortly after the introduction of 
American forces into the Vietnam war, 
the ICRC in June 1965 reminded the 
Governments of the United States, 
South Vietnam, and North Vietnam, hy 
letter, of the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and of their pre-
vious commitments to adhere to the 
conventions.55 The JCRC also indicated 
it would attempt to deliver the letter to 
the National Liberation Front (NLF), 
the political arm of the Viet Congo 
All parties, including the NLF, re-
plied to the JCRC letter. The United 
States and South Victnam gave unquali-
ficd assurance of thcir compliancc with 
the conventions and authorized the 
ICRC to send designatcd inspection 
representatives. 5 6 North Vietnam's re-
ply was not as straightforward. It was a 
lengthy reply couched in terms that 
make it difficult to isolate truly respon-
sive portions. The Ictter did state that 
"pilots" would he regarded as "major 
criminals" and liable to the laws of 
North Vietnam, "allhough captlJrl:d 
pilots are treated well. "57 Clearly, 
North Vietnam was saying officially 
that they treated pilots well, hut re-
served the right not to do so. The NLF 
flatly refused to he hound hy the 
Geneva Conventions; however, they 
affirmed that "prisoners held were 
humanely treated and that, above all, 
enemy wounded were collected and 
eared for."5 1\ Upon sending troops in 
support of South Vietnam, all other 
nations (notahly Australia, New Zea-
lanel, Thailand, South Korca, and the 
Philippines) acknowledged the Geneva 
Conventions as hinding. Thus, all active: 
participants in the Vietnam war, except 
the NLF, formally announced their 
general adherence to the conventions. 
The record of the United States in 
Vietnam relative to the treatment of 
prisoners of war has not been officially 
questioned by the enemy. However, two 
major issues have arisen, one involving 
overt actions of the South Vietnamese. 
In each instance attention to the issues 
has been "self-generated," being insti-
tuted by Americans, not the cncmy. 
As early as 1964, reports began 
reaching the United States concerning 
maltreatment of Viet Cong prisoners of 
war by South Vietnamese captors. 
These reports continued through 1965, 
the time of American commitment to 
the ground war, and eonccrned enemy 
personnel initially captured by Amcri-
can forces as well as those captured by 
South Vietnamese forces. In a few 
instances American personnel were pic-
tured observing the alleged maltreat-
ments. These instances apparently took 
place at the scene of the fighting or 
during evacuation from it.5 9 There is 
liLLIe doubt that instances of maltreat-
ment occurred. There has ncver been a 
war in .. which somc frontlinc maltrcat-
ment has not taken place.6 0 The an-
nounced American position was that 
these incidents of maltreatment were 
alleged against an ally, South Vietnam, 
which bore responsibility for handling 
prisoners, not the United States. This 
initial American position was legally 
correct but morally questionable. There 
is "no provision in the Geneva Conven-
tions making a nation responsible for 
violations committed by its allies.'>6 1 
Initially, American ground forces 
turned over enemy prisoners to the 
South Vietnamese forces as Soon as 
possible. Mindful of the maltreatment 
charges, the U.S. forces changed pro-
cedures in 1966 and retained custody of 
captured enemy until delivered to rear 
area eamps.62 No similar charges were 
made aftrr this until 1969, whcn rd(~asc 
of information lIl"~ging tlw unlawful 
killing of some 100 South Vidnamesc 
civilians at the Song My hamlet of My 
Lai, SOllth Vietnam, on 16 March 1968. 
335 
At this writing, a number of American 
fighting men arc awaiting trial on 
charges resulting from actions at My 
Lai. Fourteen others have been charged 
with repressing information concerning 
the incident and may be brought to 
trial.63 
The South Vietnamese operate the 
prisoner-of-war camps containing some 
31,500 North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong prisoners of war. There have been 
documented cases of maltreatment in 
the six camps operated by the South 
Vietnamese. Significantly, complaints in 
these cases have been .filed by the lCRC 
representativcs having acecss to the 
camps for inspection. I; 4 The prisoners 
are pcrmittcd to send and receive mail. 
An accounting of the prisoners is made 
and lists arc made availablc to North 
Vietnam and the NLF.65 Every effort is 
made to comply with the Geneva Con-
ventions and rcquests of the ICRC 
representatives.66 
The story of treatment of allied 
prisoners of war (United States, South 
Vietnam, South Korea, Australian, and 
others) by the North Vietnamese (and 
thcir con federates, the Viet Cong, under 
the NLF) is far from complete. That 
which is known is available from two 
sources; the information the North Vi(:t-
namese have seen fit to disclose for 
propaganda and political purposes and 
from questioning of released or escaped 
prisoncrs.67 Evcn with the limited 
sources of information available to datc, 
the complctc disregard of international 
law by North Victnam is abundantly 
clear. Equally clear, and of greater 
concern, is thc callous treatment of 
prisoners of war by the North Viet-
namese. They have shown the same 
characteristics of Communists in pre-
vious wars: a complete disregard for 
humalll: treatmcnt; a concerted effort to 
us(' prisoners for propa~an(la purpos($; 
lind lin utter disn'ganl for tl\(\ welfare of 
thcir own pcople once captured. 
In mid-J uly 1966, broadcasts from 
Radio Hanoi and dispatches from 
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Communist newsmen served notice that 
captured American flyers were to be 
tried as war criminals, and American 
prisoners were paraded, manacled, in 
the streets of Hanoi, presumably to 
whip up local public support. Photo-
graphs of thcse happcnings werc taken 
~nd disseminated in the world press.68 
This bra7.en effort at political blaekmail 
baekfired. The obvious intent of con-
ducting trials of thcse prisoners to forel: 
a halt in the bombing of North Vil~tnam 
and gain world sympathy was a mis-
calculation. U.N. Secretary General U 
Thant, the Pope, and American organi-
7.ations opposed to the war in Vietnam 
51:nt appeals to Ho Chi Minh to stop the 
scheduled trials. Even the so-called U.S. 
Senate "doves," spearhcadcd by Scnator 
Frank Church, issucd strong statements 
against the trials.69 On 23 July 1966, 
Ho Chi Minh backed down and an-
nounccd that "no trials were in view." 
It appears that when Ho Chi Minh 
reali7.ed he was losing support for his 
political objectives, particularly from 
within the United States where a hard-
ened unified American position might 
result, Ill: relcntl'd. 
Earlier, in June and Septlanber 1965, 
following trials and cxecution of Viet. 
Cong terrorists by the South Vietnam 
Government, the Liheration Radio of 
thc Vict Cong announced that Ameriean 
prisoners of war had been cxccuted in 
retaliation for the trial and execution of 
the tcrrorists. Im:spective of thc legul or 
moral issues concerning acts of reprisal, 
thc wanton murdcr of American pris-
oners in retaliation for an act of South 
Vietnam is clearly neither legally nor 
morally valid. The ICRC concurrcd in 
this view in filing formal complaints and 
requesting permission to investigate. 7 0 
The execution of onc of these vic-
tiIns, Capt. Humbert R. Versm:e, was 
con firmed in December 196B by 1\ laj. 
James N. Rowe wlwn he escaped aftl~r 
being a prisoner of the Viet Cong for 
over 5 years.7 1 Rowe and Versace had 
been among a group of eight prisoncrs 
captured by the Vil:t Cong in Oetobl:r 
1963 and hdd in till: ddta n:p;ion of 
South Vietnam. According to Rowe, 
threc of the prisoners dicd during cap-
tivity in J966 and 1967, while the other 
three wcre released through Cambodia 
in October 1967.72 
The story unfolded by Rowe sub-
stantiates that the Viet Gong follow the 
same pattern already estahlished by the 
Communists for treatment of prisolwrs 
of war. Immediately after eapture Rowe 
was §iven an ICRG data eard to fill 
ou L. 7 Appended to this card was a 
lengthy questionnaire concerning full 
details of personal and military history, 
training, and military intelligence. Rowe 
refused to fiII out the questionnaire; 
then the established Communist treat-
ment started. Rowe was subjected to 
isolation from human contact and 
placed in a confining, uncomfortable 
cage as conditioners for the inevitable 
indoctrination. Part of the indoctrina-
tion included explanations that Rowe 
was a criminal having 'no rights and that 
his captors had the right to execute him. 
The reason given for not executing him 
was the "lenient policy" of the Viet 
Congo Upon "failing indoctrination les-
sons," Rowe was sent to a punishment 
camp where he was subjected to treat-
ment even worse than before. His dieto£ 
rice and salt, without water, severely 
strained his stamina and will to survive. 7 4 
The politically inspircd, unprl:dict-
ahl!: releascs of othcr groups of Amcri-
can prisoners, cithcr to pcacc-seeking 
antiwar Americans in Cambodia or at 
arranged meetings in c1earcd areas of 
South Vietnam, also provides insight to 
prisoner-of-war treatment by North 
Vietnam and the Viet Congo The stories 
of some of those men have not been 
puhlished for fear of jeopardi?ing thosc 
remaining as prisOIwrs. What has IIm'n 
loltl is anollwr ehrnnidl~ of l:nll'l mill 
inhullIan trt:alnHmt hy llw Cllnllnunists. 
In August 1969, Navy Ll. Robert F. 
Frishman, upon his release, related his 
expcriences as a prisoner of war of the 
Communists, which included solitary 
confinement, imprisonment in a eage, 
bdng bound in straps, removal of his 
fingernails, being denied food and 
medical care, and hdng dragged along 
the ground while suffering a brohn ·Ieg. 
Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, released at 
the same time after over 2 years of 
captivity, was also maltreated. He had 
lost over 60 pounds since his capture 
and had spent 7 months and 10 days in 
solitary confinement. 
The experience of Lt. (jg) Dieter 
Dengler, USN, during 1966 presents a 
stark example of treatment at the hands 
of the Communists in Southeast Asia. 
Dengler was captured but later managed 
to escape to U.S. lines. Captured by tlu: 
Pathet Lao and turned over to the 
North Vietnamese, Dengler was spread-
eagled on the ground and left to tlw 
mercy of insects. He was tied in position 
and us(:d for nerve· racking target prac-
tice. Repeatedly, Dengler was bcaten 
with fists and sticks, being rendered 
unconscious on one occasion. As further 
pcrsuasion to sign a statement con-
demning the United States and ap-
parently to heighten the enjoyment of 
his captors, Dengler was bound and 
dragged through the bush hehind a 
water buffalo. At the time of his reseue 
this formerly IHO.pound pilot wdghed 
9H pounds.7s 
The stories' of maltreatment from 
escaped prisoners, and even from those 
rcll!ased for propaganda purposes, have 
a common thread. Admittedly, the 
documented evidence available at this 
time is limit(:d. Yet the evidcrlee avail-
able is overwhelmingly uniform in re-
flecting callous and inhumane treatment 
of our prisoners in the hands of the 
Communists in Southeast Asia. A pat-
tern has emerged which includes jungle 
camps operated by the Viet Cong and 
the Pathet Lao and the larger permam:nt 
camps operated by the North Vietna' 
mese. The most notorious of these 
North Vietnamese camps is known al-
ready as the "Hanoi Hilton." It appears 
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likely that this facility will join "Pak's 
Palace" of the Korean war on tlH! list of 
infamous prisol\(:r.of-war camps. 
These limited glimpses of the treat-
m(:nt of prisoners of war in Vietnam 
give cause for grave concern for the 
treatment of the estimated J ,400 
American prisoners still in the hands of 
the Communists in Vietnam. 76 As of 
Fehruary 1970, the Department of De-
fense listed 422 Americans known to 
have been in the hands of the Commu-
nists in ViI:tnam. These figures have 
been compiled from eyewitness battle 
accounts, information from released 
prisoners, as well as from Hanoi press 
and radio announcements.77 The Com-
munists have to dall: refused to eomi.ly 
with the Geneva Conventions and pro-
vide lists of prisoners they hold. In 
March J970 North Vil!lnam did 
acknowledge to an Associated Press 
newsman (Daniel De Luee) that they 
held 320 American prisoners of war and 
"were considering" releasing their 
names, not to ICRC representatives, but 
to "friendly" news media.7 8 
Repeated attempts by the Ameriean 
Government and relatives to obtain in-
formation on AIll(:riean prisoners held 
hy the Communists have failed. 7 9 
R(!Sponsl! to thes(: grou I's wou 1<1 not 
materially henefit or support the politi-
cal objectives of the Communists and, 
therefore, seem doomed to failure. Mas-
sive direct pressure by American citi-
zens, appeals by "dovish" U.S. Con-
gressmen and other vehement American 
antiwar groups, and concentrated ef-
forts by the Government through the 
United Nations would appear to offer 
the best opportunity for determining 
the status of American prisoners in 
Vietnam and insuring their welfare and 
ultimate freedom. Since the North Viet-
namese consider thcir own captured 
personnel as expendahle and since they 
know WI: value highly the lives and 
welfare of our soldiers in captivity, they 
are using their control of our prisoners 
of war as a bargaining tool for propa-
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ganda and leverage for a seulement of 
the war favorable to them. 
Legacy and Lessons. The develop-
ment of meaningful and essential inter-
national law relative to prisoners of war 
has been extremely slow, yet ever more 
precisely defined. Up to World War II 
this development had significant impact 
on improving the humanitarian treat-
ment of prisoners. From World War II 
ca)1le the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which materially strengthened the law 
in this area, more elearly defined its 
application, and provided for humane 
treatment agreed upon by some 117 
nations as of 1968.30 From World War 
II also came distinct evid{:nce that, 
regardless. of the law and weight of 
world opinion, the Communists did not 
intend to abide by international law to 
which they and others had commiUed 
themselves. As the history of World War 
II unfolded with the pasSing of time, 
more precise proof became available. 
The extent and enormity of some of the 
evidence strains humanitarian under-
standing, and even today many ignore 
or refuse to assess the record. 
In the aftermath of the Korean war it 
became elear once again that the Com-
munists had shown an utter disregard 
for internation:11 law and contempt for 
humanitarian treatment of prisoners of 
war, which other peoples and nations 
sought to uphold. Though smaller in 
scale, the barbaric and cruel treatment 
of prisoners of war by the Communists 
established a record in modern times for 
the high rate of death among captives. 
Again the rules for conduct of affairs 
among nations were severely set back. 
This demonstrated contempt for the 
preccpts of human dignity and com-
passion for fellowmen is appalling. This, 
coupled with the hypocrisy of elaiming 
adherence to international law, whih~ 
resolutely and {!onsistently failing to do 
so, invites more grave questions. Al-
though only shreds of evidence are 
available from the current war in Viet-
nam, these shreds point to the Commu-
nists adding to the legacy pass(:d on 
from World War 11 and Korea. 
A review of history supports the 
contention that prisoncrs of war havc 
been used as instruments of foreign 
policy. Concurrent with the evolution 
of international law, mounting concern 
for the humane treatmcnt of prisOlH:rs 
of war has rcsultcd in increasing weIl-
defined international agreements to pro-
tect the victims of war, thus tending to 
reduce thc effcctivcness of prisoners of 
war as inslrunH:nls of foreign potiey for 
those nations a(lIl1:ring to tIl!: law. 
Starting in World War II and continuing 
through to the current Vietnam war, the 
Communists have demonstratcd a com-
plete reluctance to be inhibited in their 
use of prisoners of war to achieve 
national and international political ob-
jectives. This remains so, whether or not 
they profess adherencc to international 
conventions. 
Based on the record of trcatment 
accorded their own pcople whcn rc-
covered from captivity, the Communists 
arc not receptive to bargaining for thc 
exchange or tn:atment of prisolwrs 
predicated on humanitarian prineiph:s. 
Accordingly, it appears that cven when 
assured of our propricty in the treat-
IIlI:IIt of llwir priHOIH:rH, tIll: CO/ll/llllniHtH 
arc unwilling to reciprocate and guaran-
tee humane treatment for U.S. prisoners 
of war. This, coupled with thc funda-
mental principle of the dignity and 
rights of man upon which the Govern-
ment of the United States is based, rules 
out any consideration of reprisal against 
Communist prisoners as ineffective and 
repugnant. 
Thus, to obtain humane treatment 
and release of prisoners from Commu-
nist control, it appears that the most 
re~llisti(: alternative is to marshal Am(:ri-
e:m opinion unifying tlw eoulltry on tIll: 
issue. To affirm our n:solv(: to ckny tIn: 
Communists their political ohjeetiv(:s 
through usc of ollr prisoners of w:lr is 
the most positiVI: way to insure their 
fair treatment and release. In this regard 
the text of President Nixon's First 
Annual Foreign Affairs Message to 
Congress of February 1970 conccrning 
thc treatmcnt and rclease of prisoners of 
war merits comment and is quoted in 
part bclow: 
This [prisoners of war in Viet-
nam] is not a political or military 
issue, but a matter of basic 
humanity. There may be disagrcc-
mcnt about other aspects of this 
conflict, but thcre can be no 
disagreement on humane treat-
ment for prisoners of war. I state 
again our readiness to proceed at 
once to arrangements for the re-
lease of prisoners of war on both 
sides.81 
This statement is a true reflcction of 
previously stated American policy and 
most likely was heartily supported by 
the majority of people of the United 
States. However, considering that it is.a 
part of a 40,000-word address designed 
for foreign as well as domcstic con-
sumption, the rcaetion of the Commu-
nists would seem of paramount impor-
tance. The Communists would not agree 
with the first portion of the pronounc(!-
mcnL which statcs that the prisorwr-o(-
war qucstion in Vietnam " •.. is not a 
political or military issue, but a matter 
of basic humanity." The history of 
Communist actions disputes that por-
tion of the address which states 
" •.• thcre can be no disagreement on 
humane treatment for prisoners of 
war." Finally, in advising the Commu-
nists of "our readincss to proceed at 
once with arrangements for the release 
of prison~s of war on bO!.h. sides," they 
are being advised of a fact of which they 
have been fully cognizant. In summary, 
the statement of the President appears to 
have contributed little toward obtaining 
humane treatment and release of Ameri-
can prisoners of war. 
Positive statements by our national 
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leaders are needed, recognizing that 
prisoners of war are used as "political 
instruments" by the Communists, but 
affirming U.S. rcjection of this practice. 
Idcntification and clarification of the 
fact that thcre is "disagreement on 
humane treatment of prisoners of war" 
between the Communists and ourselves 
is also required. Lastly, a positive dec-
laration should be made that any peace 
negotiations must first obtain agree-
mcnts on the accounting for and release 
of prisoncrs of war. 
Thc CommunisL practicc of releasing 
small groups of our prisoners of war to 
American pacifist groups should be 
dcnounced for the degrading and in-
humane practice it is. As slated by the 
Washington Evening Star the practice is 
"a little like the Oriental water torture-
and just as humanitarian." To put this 
release ploy in perspective, consider that 
at the current rate of release it would 
take over 400 years to obtain the release 
of our captured men.82 
Ho Chi Minh recanted in July 1966 
on his threat to try American prisoners 
as war criminals due to til(! w(~ight of 
world public opinion, especially the 
slaLements of some U.S. Senators. Again 
in August 1969, at the instigation of 
prisoners' next of kin, 42 U.S. Senators 
signed a strong statement condemning 
North Vietnam for its record of viola-
tion of international law and for its 
"crucl and inhuman treatment of 
prisoners of war." This statement also 
condemned the callous treatment of the 
families of prisoners who traveled to 
Paris seeking information about the 
prisoners from the North Vietnamese 
delegates to the peace talks. On 21 
August the North Vietnamese rejected 
the protest. It is significant to note that 
sollie of the leading antiwar Senators, 
including the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee, had not 
signed the statement of protest. The full 
impact of a similar statement signed by 
all 100 Senators or" of a joint resolution 
by Congress is a maller of conjecture. 
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The question that presents itself is 
"Why should this critical matter he left 
to conjccturc?" 
The necd to focus attention on the 
current plight of American prisoners in 
the hands of the Communists is evident. 
Previous limited success in comhating 
the Communists' use of prisoners of war 
as instruments of foreign policy has 
been allained only when antiwar fa(:-
tions in the United States, particularly 
members of Congress, have repudiatcd 
these inhuman practices. It appears that 
these factors must drive concerted 
American efforts to deny the Commu-
nists their political objectives. The eon-
tin ued maltreatment of American 
prisoncrs of war in direct violation of 
international law is totally Ultaec(:pt-
ablc. 
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